Articles that I read

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    Showing posts with label India. Show all posts
    Showing posts with label India. Show all posts

    Friday, November 7, 2008

    All quiet on the Tamil front

    Its been long time since I have seen an incisive article like this. No faff, but just a fresh look at things on hand, wonder why it did not make it to the front pages. Another scam in the making? Will have to wait for a change in the Centre to know that.

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    Arati R Jerath
    Saturday, November 01, 2008  23:58 IST




    The flare-up between the DMK and the Congress on the LTTE issue died as suddenly as it erupted. One day we saw DMK chief M Karunanidhi threatening to pull out from the UPA and ordering a mass resignation by Tamil MPs.

    Less than a week later, he purred like a tame cat and declared that the crisis was over. Just like that. Curiously, the ground situation in Sri Lanka, which caused the flare-up in the first place, hadn’t changed.
    The Sri Lankan army continues to inch its way to the LTTE headquarters in Killinochchi and it looks to be a matter of time before the Eelam dream of Lanka Tamils finally collapses. Puzzled political observers have been joining the dots to understand the abrupt about turn by Karunanidhi and they are finding it difficult to shake off the uncomfortable feeling that the stink originates in the telecom ministry held by DMK minister A Raja.

    For the past few months, the government has been flooded by complaints from NGO telecom watchdogs about the manner in which spectrum licences were handed out this year, without following the accepted international practice of holding an auction for the best price.

    Such was the pressure that the government was actually moving to order a preliminary inquiry by the CBI. Curiously, the big bang from Chennai came almost immediately. Mere coincidence? Could be, except that the government has apparently dropped plans to have the CBI investigate the complaints and Karunanidhi has torn up the resignation letters of his MPs. All’s quiet on the Tamil front once again.

    The flare-up between the DMK and the Congress on the LTTE issue died as suddenly as it erupted. One day we saw DMK chief M Karunanidhi threatening to pull out from the UPA and ordering a mass resignation by Tamil MPs.

    Less than a week later, he purred like a tame cat and declared that the crisis was over. Just like that. Curiously, the ground situation in Sri Lanka, which caused the flare-up in the first place, hadn’t changed.
    The Sri Lankan army continues to inch its way to the LTTE headquarters in Killinochchi and it looks to be a matter of time before the Eelam dream of Lanka Tamils finally collapses. Puzzled political observers have been joining the dots to understand the abrupt about turn by Karunanidhi and they are finding it difficult to shake off the uncomfortable feeling that the stink originates in the telecom ministry held by DMK minister A Raja.

    For the past few months, the government has been flooded by complaints from NGO telecom watchdogs about the manner in which spectrum licences were handed out this year, without following the accepted international practice of holding an auction for the best price.

    Such was the pressure that the government was actually moving to order a preliminary inquiry by the CBI. Curiously, the big bang from Chennai came almost immediately. Mere coincidence? Could be, except that the government has apparently dropped plans to have the CBI investigate the complaints and Karunanidhi has torn up the resignation letters of his MPs. All’s quiet on the Tamil front once again.

    http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1202596

    Sunday, July 13, 2008

    The advantages of irrelevance


    Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar,

    Having won over the Samajwadi Party (SP), the Manmohan Singh government can push ahead with the Indo-US nuclear deal, and hope to complete its full five-year term. If the government survives the trust vote, Congressmen will be delighted, since they are terrified of an early election, given that inflation is running at 12%.

    Their delight will be tempered by the bitter knowledge that the once-mighty Congress is steadily decreasing in political relevance, in state after state. Yet, ironically, its growing irrelevance in the states has actually helped it survive in New Delhi. Even dark clouds have silver linings, sometimes very broad ones.

    When the Congress won more seats than the BJP in the 2004 general election, it was far short of an absolute majority, and sought the assistance of every possible party to cobble together a ruling coalition. It sought the support of the SP too. But Mulayam Singh Yadav said absolutely no. He feared that a Congress government in New Delhi might find ways to cut him to size in Uttar Pradesh or even oust him, and then stage a comeback in India's largest state. Mulayam feared that the Congress might win back the support of UP Muslims, who had defected to him in droves after the demolition of the Babri Masjid. So, he declined firmly to support the Manmohan Singh government.

    Why then has he suddenly changed tack, and saved Manmohan Singh's bacon? Because he is finally convinced that the Congress has become irreversibly irrelevant in UP, and should no longer be viewed as a threat. In the 2007 state assembly election, Rahul Gandhi, heir apparent of the Congress, himself spearheaded the party's state campaign, and aimed to win back lost ground. Alas, the Congress came a pathetic fourth in the state election, far behind the BSP, SP and BJP. Despite Rahul's efforts, the Congress tally of seats actually fell from 25 to 22. The party won just 8.4% of the popular vote, down from 12% in 2004.

    Its decline in the state worsened in the five by-elections in the state in April this year. The BSP swept all five seats, and the Congress lost its deposit in four of the five. The once-hegemonic party of India had become a pathetic also-ran.

    This, above all, explains why the SP has decided to support the Manmohan Singh government. It can afford to do so because the Congress has become irrelevant in UP. It is now a party to be used, not feared. The only parties that matter now in the state are Mayawati's BSP and Mulayam's SP, with the BJP and Congress playing minor roles. In this scenario, Mulayam can use the Congress to harass Mayawati, by pursuing corruption and income tax cases against her more vigorously. And he can hope to come back to power in UP in the next state election by having the Congress as a very junior ally.

    This drives home the point that, in a highly fractured polity, weakness in some regions can translate into an advantage in New Delhi. In the 1990s, this factor played to the advantage of the BJP. It had some strength in the Hindi-speaking heartland, and in Gujarat. But in other parts of the country it had little or no strength. Yet, it managed to come to power in 1998 with the assistance of sundry regional parties.

    For most regional parties, their main local foe was the Congress party. Hence, they were willing to support the BJP simply as their enemy's enemy. The TDP, AIADMK, BLD, Samata Party, and others joined Vajpayee's NDA government. The very fact that the BJP was so weak in their respective states meant they faced no threat from it locally, and that made it a more attractive partner in New Delhi.

    The Congress was upset to see professedly secular parties like the TDP and Samata Party joining hands with the BJP. It made strong declarations at its Pachmarhi summit about spurning opportunistic regional parties, and seeking to return to power on its own. Yet, this had the practical effect of pushing regional parties further into the BJP camp.

    Those delusions of grandeur have gone now. The Congress has declined in one state after another, and knows that it cannot rule without allies. It has submitted to constant humiliation by the Left Front for four years in New Delhi, knowing that this is the price for survival.

    Yet, this humiliating decline is now proving to be an advantage. Lalu Yadav, who for most of his political career had viewed the Congress as his main foe in Bihar, realised in 2004 that the Congress had become so irrelevant in the state that he could afford to ally with it. That realisation was what made the current UPA government possible: Lalu could join it without jeopardising his own position in Bihar.

    The same thing has now happened in UP. There, too, the Congress has become irrelevant. And so Mulayam can afford to support the Manmohan Singh government in New Delhi. Rahul Gandhi may be a pale shadow of what was once an all-powerful Gandhi family. But that actually enhances his attractions.


    Article Link

    Saturday, July 12, 2008

    Right for good governance

    A day after I wrote on the SP’s ulterior objective, I was pleasantly surprised to see an article (Let us not lose sight of good governance ) that raised this issue in the newsprint. Surprising because it’s rare to see such open opinions in my usual read The ToI. But this was from The Hindu, who I feel are usually more outspoken about their political opinions (though sometimes criticised as one-sided).


    Here the writer (Harish Khare) has been able to put a better perspective to the issue of the murky Ambanis’ feud getting into Governmental issues. The article gives more data and history to the story. But at one place the article fails. Towards the end of his argument Khare goes on to state “If the ruling alliance’s new ally wants to use its status to correct a perceived tilt, we would all be better off. Even in this age of market reforms, the corporate houses are totally beyond the government’s reach; nor are they above wanting to suborn the law and the loyalties; therefore, if the new political alignments in New Delhi are used to bring about a healthy balance, so be it. Irrespective of the dramatis personae, it would provide the much-needed corrective to our public discourse if we are able to debate on the economics and ethics of allowing windfall profits in a country of vast poverty.”


    Well, after all this argument he simply states that “two wrongs make a right” or rather “it is the end and not the means”. I do not subscribe to that policy. If we are letting the Government run according to the individual agendas of its coalition parties who walk in and out like people in a mall, then where is the reason for a political manifesto. In the future elections let’s not invest in anyway-a-farce-statement called Manifesto or now the Common Minimum Programme. Next time on we are into a two party system like the US, albeit with a difference. The political parties will state whether their mandate is to protect Anil or Mukesh. The rest will fall in line. Given that the Ambanis’ are increasingly getting into the nerve of every Indian, this policy should suffice. So if your worry today is that the communication industry is not functioning properly, then vote for the Anil party. The ensuing Government will roll out subsidies for upgrading the CDMA services, slap hefty licenses on GSM providers and bingo.


    We have a right to demand ideal political conditions. Mr. Khare, I agree that sometimes these cannot be helped. But as a think tank on a leading newsreel, your duty bound to suggest, to fight for the better and not succumb to the present.


    Last head: PM, govt top guns may broker Ambani peace deal. That's nice job for a change.

    Monday, July 7, 2008

    A healthier future for India

    The McKinsey Quarterly



    Affordable care, preventive medicine, and healthy behavior must be the pillars of India’s health care reform.


    January 2008

    Over the past four years of historic economic growth, leaders in India have come to realize that to emerge as a global economic superpower, the country must invest in its social fabric—in particular, education and health care. These investments are all the more necessary, as India is expected to become the world’s most populous country by 2035. It is already the youngest: home to 20 percent of the world’s people under 24 years of age. Without a doubt, this realization is a big step forward, but it isn’t enough.
    India should also develop innovative approaches that will enable its leaders in all corners of society—business, government, and civil society—to help build an educated workforce and a healthy country. Having spent much of my life in a dialogue among business, government, and civil society, I truly believe that when they work in partnership, intractable issues are addressed more successfully, to the benefit of all. The Public Health Foundation of India (PHFI), which I helped set up, illustrates the effectiveness of this collaborative approach.
    India is well positioned to tackle its health care challenges for two fundamental reasons. First, it has the privilege of learning from and avoiding the costly errors of the advanced economies. Second, it has an opportunity to create new models that draw upon the strengths of every sector of society: the organizational agility of business in mobilizing resources and delivering services, the philanthropic character of the nonprofit sector in caring for India’s needy millions, and the legitimizing role of government in balancing society’s egalitarian impulses with the economy’s demand for the effective delivery of services.
    Unquestionably, designing ways to strengthen the health care system will challenge the ingenuity of India’s government officials, business executives, academics, and nonprofit leaders. The task will require leadership skills that can mobilize all Indians behind a grand national purpose.
    An India ready for such leadership must increase the availability of quality care and access to affordable health care services and, still more important, create an awareness of the benefits of preventive measures—all in a way adapted to the country’s social structures. Concerted efforts in this direction should be the cornerstone of health care reform in India. By focusing on these three factors, India can overcome a significant part of its enormous health burdens: high infant mortality; low overall life expectancy; malnutrition; chronic outbreaks of preventable diseases, such as cholera, malaria, pneumonia, and tuberculosis; the growing incidence of diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and cancer; an HIV/AIDS epidemic that has afflicted over five million people; and the limited availability of clean water and basic sanitation.
    As the foundation of the effort, India should significantly augment its health infrastructure. A scan of the provider landscape reveals a chronic shortfall: the country has only 1.5 beds per 1,000 people, for instance. That is much lower than the average—three to four beds per 1,000 people—in developing economies such as Brazil, China, South Africa, and Thailand and way behind developed areas (like the United States and Western Europe), which have four to eight beds per 1,000 people. Moreover, with 0.6 doctors and 0.08 nurses per thousand people, India has significantly fewer of them than the world average: 1.2 doctors and 2.6 nurses per 1,000 people, according to a recent World Health Organization report.
    In a country where 70 percent of the population lives in rural areas and the poor rely on the public system for preventive and inpatient care, such shortages pose a significant challenge: public institutions handle 93 percent of immunizations, 74 percent of prenatal care, 66 percent of inpatient bed days, and 63 percent of delivery-related inpatient bed days. Such challenges are worrisome because, according to current estimates, government spending on hospital infrastructure will probably increase at a rate of only 2 percent a year over the next decade—lagging far behind society’s needs.
    Several measures should be undertaken to augment the pool of medical professionals and trained workers. The system needs stewardship at all levels: strong policies and institutions that foster public-private partnerships, encourage the private sector to invest in rural areas, and strengthen the resource pool so that flagship programs (such as the National Rural Health Mission) can succeed. In particular, policy reforms that address talent shortages and the creation of institutional providers must at least meet the nation’s basic infrastructure needs.
    Access to affordable health care services is equally important and has been widely and thoroughly discussed in recent years. Yet here too, adequate reforms have not been implemented. India spends scarcely 1 percent of GDP on health care—and less than a quarter of that sum on the actual delivery of health care programs. So, it’s little surprise that about 80 percent of the health care expenses are funded out of pocket by individuals, and a mere 1 to 2 percent is covered by private insurance, which is predominantly employer-funded. It is unfortunate that even today people have to borrow money or sell assets to pay for inpatient care and as a result often postpone or do not avail of care.
    Action on three fronts, among others, is vital. First, a series of policy reforms will be needed to provide subsidized health insurance for the country’s poorest citizens. A successful approach could leverage institutions such as large cooperatives and self-help groups to broaden their reach, attract participation from nongovernmental organizations and the private sector to supply needed services, and promote a central data institution that enables systematic health economics and publicizes such information for continuous improvement. Efforts to encourage competition among health insurance services and to extend them to lower-income citizens would also be beneficial.
    Second, innovation in products is essential. Today, most of them offer only limited services, limited reimbursements, or both and don’t cover preexisting conditions or outpatient expenses. To cover more people, insurance firms need to design products that cater to several income classes and age groups, cover alternative therapies, and provide more comprehensive coverage. Third, a regulatory environment that recognizes health insurance as distinct from other lines of business is necessary to boost the sector’s growth.
    For a nation that depends largely on reactive measures to control disease, promoting awareness of prevention may be one of the most critical components of reform. Most people do not understand the importance of preventive or wellness measures, which are critical to avoid the lifestyle diseases that become significantly more common as economies grow richer. Consumer spending on health care is likely to rise by more than 8 percent annually until 2025—particularly on medical services, equipment, and pharmaceuticals. Initiatives such as education campaigns, which can shift spending to preventive measures, are vital, since a majority of India’s population is illiterate and thus difficult to educate about health priorities.
    Campaigns to improve awareness of disease prevention and the early treatment of illness will require the well-organized deployment of large networks of public-health workers to communicate dangers such as the abuse of tobacco and alcohol, unhealthy diets, and environmental pollution. Unfortunately, India does not fully recognize public health as a discipline—each year, it produces only some 500 professionals in the field, about what each public-health school in the developed world does. This lack of formal structures was one of the key reasons for the establishment of the Public Health Foundation of India, which aspires to create institutions that will impart a quality education in public health, to establish accreditation standards in public-health education, and to conduct policy-shaping research, all governed by the underlying objective of improving public health in India. Similar efforts to inform Indians about ways of gaining access to health care services should also be undertaken, since the nation as a whole is significantly underinsured.
    To reiterate, three essential priorities—increasing the availability of care, access to affordable care, and awareness of healthy behavior and of the health care resources available to Indians—can be addressed successfully only if all sectors of society work together. All too often, government planners, business executives, and nonprofit organizations have operated at cross-purposes and failed to coordinate their efforts in ways that would achieve shared goals.
    Public-private cooperation to confront an array of challenges—including the need for better insurance coverage, more widespread health education, and better disease prevention—can improve the health of Indians in the long run. Sustainable economic development in India will require more than just a growing economy: It also requires a healthy workforce, nurtured by a society that invests adequately in broad-scale health initiatives. Investments in human capital and in keeping Indian society as a whole safe from potentially large-scale health threats will help the country to maximize the potential of its most productive resource: the ingenuity and creativity of its people.

    About the Author
    Rajat Gupta is a senior partner emeritus.
    This article was adapted from ”A leader for a healthy India,” which first appeared in Business Today’s 16th-anniversary issue, dated January 2008.

    Saturday, July 5, 2008

    What a way to run the world

    Now its on front page. The foreign policy that India had in the past decade has only been how to get a seat in the security council. Representing more than 1/6 of humanity, largest democracy and oldest civilization, it was odd to see India being left out of the big bodies that "manage" the world order. But now along with the old titles it also has the most important title of economic superpower (albeit growing). Good press like this lead article on economist supporting the inclusion of emerging giants like India and Brazil in world organisations and will bring in more credibility (also buy in) to these organisations' claim that they maintain world peace. India has grown beyond the bickering of Pakistan, but it has got a new obstacle in form of China that will be uncomfortable having a superpower in its neighbourhood. The elections in India and US will stall any progress in this area for another year but then China does not have such hinderances.

    ----Vj
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------


    Global institutions are an outdated muddle; the rise of Asia makes their reform a priority for the West


    CLUBS are all too often full of people prattling on about things they no longer know about. On July 7th the leaders of the group that allegedly runs the world—the G7 democracies plus Russia—gather in Japan to review the world economy. But what is the point of their discussing the oil price without Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest producer? Or waffling about the dollar without China, which holds so many American Treasury bills? Or slapping sanctions on Robert Mugabe, with no African present? Or talking about global warming, AIDS or inflation without anybody from the emerging world? Cigar smoke and ignorance are in the air.

    The G8 is not the only global club that looks old and impotent (see article). The UN Security Council has told Iran to stop enriching uranium, without much effect. The nuclear non-proliferation regime is in tatters. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the fireman in previous financial crises, has been a bystander during the credit crunch. The World Trade Organisation’s Doha round is stuck. Of course, some bodies, such as the venerable Bank for International Settlements (see article), still do a fine job. But as global problems proliferate and information whips round the world ever faster, the organisational response looks ever shabbier, slower and feebler. The world’s governing bodies need to change.

    Time for a cull?

    There has always been an excuse for putting off reform. For a long time it was the cold war; more recently, “the unipolar moment” convinced neoconservatives that America could run things alone. But now calls for change are coming thick and fast. Britain’s prime minister, Gordon Brown, and America’s treasury secretary, Hank Paulson, want to redesign global financial regulation. Others are looking at starting afresh: John McCain is promoting a League of Democracies, while Asian countries are setting up clubs of their own—there is even talk of an Asian Union to match the European one. And many critics, especially in America, want a cull. Surely economic progress in the emerging world argues for getting rid of the World Bank? Is a divided Security Council really any use?

    The critics are right to argue that global organisations should be more focused than they are, but wrong to assume they can be dispensed with altogether. Get rid of the Security Council or the World Bank and the clamour to invent something similar would begin: you need somebody to boss around 100,000 peacekeepers and to lend to countries that find it hard to access capital markets. International talking-shops and standard-setters are here to stay; instead of trying to bin them, focus on making them work well.

    That means recognising how economics has changed the world order. Emerging economies now account for more than half of global growth. The most powerful among them need to be given a bigger say in international institutions—unless of course you think India will always be happy outside the Security Council and China content to have a smaller voting share than the Benelux countries do at the IMF.

    Any solution must accept three constraints. First, better institutions will not solve intractable problems. A larger G8 will not automatically lick inflation, a better World Food Programme would not stop hunger. Second, no matter how you reform the clubs’ membership rules, somebody somewhere will feel left out. Third, you cannot start again. In 1945 the UN’s founders had a clean slate to write upon, because everything had been destroyed. The modern age does not have that dubious luxury, so must build on what already exists.

    Take for instance the G8. Some dream of reducing it to just the economic superpowers: the United States, the EU, China and Japan. An appealing idea, but Silvio Berlusconi and Vladimir Putin are unlikely to give up their seats at the top table. Better to enlarge the current body to include the world’s biggest dozen economies. A G12 would bring India, Brazil, China and Spain into the club, while allowing Canada (just) to stay in.

    The politics of the Security Council are even more outdated. Nobody now would give France or Britain a permanent veto, but neither wants to give up that right. Meanwhile, the four obvious candidates are held back by regional jealousies: India by Pakistan; Brazil by Argentina; Germany by Italy; and Japan by China. The most sensible plan gives these four permanent but non-veto-wielding seats, with two other seats provided for Islamic countries and one for an African nation.

    America has yet to get behind these proposals, but a sharpened Security Council could mitigate the emerging world’s objections to UN reform. With a more representative high command, more jobs could be allocated on merit, the globocracy slimmed and bolder steps considered: for instance, the case for a small standing army, or earmarked forces, to nip Darfur-style catastrophes in the bud, would be easier to make.

    The Bretton Woods duo are easier to change: all that is needed is Western will. Their problem is finding a useful purpose. The World Bank is still needed as a donor to the really poor and as a supporter of global public goods, such as climate-change projects. There is less obvious need for the IMF, which was originally set up to monitor exchange rates. It could become a committee of oversight, but the main financial regulation will stay at the national level.

    League of Good Hope

    Supporters of Mr McCain’s League of Democracies suggest it could be like NATO—a useful democratic subcommittee in the global club. But Mr McCain needs to define his democracies. (Will Malaysia count? How about Russia or Iran?) And, crucially, any league must not be seen as an alternative to reforming the UN. The whole point of global talking-shops is that they include everybody, not just your friends.

    Faced with the need to reform international institutions, the rich world—and America in particular—has a choice. Cling to power, and China and India will form their own clubs, focused on their own interests and problems. Cede power and bind them in, and interests and problems are shared. Now that would be a decent way to run a world.

    Friday, July 4, 2008

    Too much hot air in nuke deal

    This editorial from today's ET brings a fresh look at the nuclear deal. Though I do not agree with the author's view that the feeling in the market is that nuclear deal will reduce oil bill, I surely do agree with the author's opinion on how the nuclear power might also become costly affair like oil given limited uranium resources. But what the author misses is the bigger psychological benefit of this deal. It is step forward for India to be recognised among elite economic groups and gradually giving it more clout in world economy. Moreover, the deal, in no way is committing India to build uneconomical nuclear plants but it will keep the doors open for it to adapt new innovations in nuclear field as and when they appear in the future.

    --Vj
    -------------------------------------------------------



    The partisan rancour over the Indo-US nuclear deal has helped obscure facts, allowing shibboleths and fantasies to substitute for an informed debate on a critical issue. Several myths continue to be repeated untiringly. The biggest of them draws a meretricious link between nuclear energy and soaring oil prices to justify the proposed import of high-priced, foreign fuel-dependent power reactors from overseas.

    What does nuclear power have to do with the price or import requirements of any transportation fuel? Thanks to the oil price shocks in the 1970s and 1980s and the advent of new energy technologies, the share of global electricity produced from oil has shrunk from 25% in 1973 to barely 4%. The remaining oil-fired power plants - of which India has only a handful - will be phased out, or refitted to run on gas. Oil now is primarily used for transportation, while the reactor-import option is about electricity generation.

    The link between nuclear power and oil is specious. In the years ahead, the world could move toward electric vehicles and even use grid power to make hydrogen for the fuel-cell vehicles of the future. In another futuristic scenario, nuclear energy may indirectly serve as a substitute to some oil use in the commercial and industrial sectors. But today, greater nuclear-generated electricity is not going to really reduce any country’s oil needs, certainly not India’s. In fact, with little overlap in the oil and nuclear global-market structures, nuclear power now competes principally against coal, natural gas and renewables.

    If global oil demand is threatening to outstrip supply, so is the case with uranium. Current concerns associated with oil’s price volatility, supply security and geopolitical risks are no different than uranium’s. And if global oil reserves are finite, so are uranium resources, with proven uranium reserves likely to last barely 85 years, according to the Red Book published jointly by the OECD and IAEA.

    In fact, in the past five years, the international spot price of uranium has risen faster than that of crude oil, with uranium today trading six times above its $10 a pound historical average. Oil and uranium prices are likely to stay volatile, but the long-term trend for both is surely up.

    Just as cheap oil now seems fanciful, cheap nuclear power for long has been a mirage. More than half a century after the then US Atomic Energy Agency chairman Lewis Strauss claimed nuclear energy would become “too cheap to meter”, the nuclear power industry everywhere subsists on generous state subsidies, not reflected in the published costs of generation.

    The current electricity-market liberalisation trends spell trouble for the global nuclear-power industry as they threaten the state support on which it survives. As a 2005 IAEA study by Ferenc Toth and Hans-Holger Rogner warns, “nuclear power’s market share might indeed follow a downward trajectory” if state subsidies abate and more cost-effective reactors are not designed.

    Other international studies have shown that nuclear power, although a long-matured technology, has demonstrated the slowest rate of learning in comparison to other energy technologies, including newer sources like wind and combined-cycle gas turbines. Instead of the price declining with nuclear power’s maturation, the opposite has happened.

    Power reactors also remain very capital-intensive, with high up-front capital costs, long lead times for construction and commissioning, and drawn-out amortisation periods that discourage private investors. In the US, two separate studies by the University of Chicago (2004) and MIT (2003) showed new nuclear power remaining comparatively more expensive.

    That explains why the US industry has yet to receive its first domestic power reactor order in more than three decades, despite the Bush administration offering among the world’s most-attractive tax sops and other state incentives.

    But in India there has been little debate on the nuclear deal’s premise - that the way to meet burgeoning energy demands is to import power reactors. While nuclear power certainly deserves a place in a diversified energy portfolio, reactor imports will be a path to external fuel dependency and exorbitant plant costs.

    India ought not to confuse its electrical generation problem with transportation fuel problem. Also, India cannot correct its oil-import dependency on the Gulf region by fashioning a new dependency on a tiny nuclear-supply cartel made up of a few state-guided firms.

    While oil is freely purchasable on world markets, the global nuclear reactor and fuel business is the most monopolised and politically regulated commerce in the world, with no sanctity of contract. Without having loosened its bondage to oil exporters, should India get yoked to the nuclear cartel?

    With few reactors being built in the West or Russia, this cartel has aggressively sought export markets. In a bizarre spectacle, after having castigated Iran’s pursuit of civil nuclear technology as unsuited to its energy wealth, France and the US have competed to sign up reactor deals with oil-rich Arab countries.

    Yet, even at the current slack rate of construction of reactors, bottlenecks are becoming a serious problem for key components. There are just a few manufacturers for many components. For example, at least nine reactor components, including giant pressure vessels and steam generators, are made only in one facility owned by Japan Steel Works. A recent study by the US-based Keystone Centre reported a six-year lead time for some parts.

    The harsh truth is that reactor imports, far from cutting India’s oil imports, will increase the already wide price differential between nuclear energy and thermal power. While all the Indian power reactors built since the 1990s have priced their electricity at between 270 and 285 paise per KW hour or higher, the coal-fired Sason plant project has contracted to sell power at 119 paise per KWh.

    Of the three countries lobbying to sell power reactors to India, the US has little record to show while France’s stands blemished by a two-year time overrun and $2.1 billion cost escalation in building Finland’s Olkiluoto-3 plant. The third, Russia, is struggling to complete its already-delayed twin reactors in Kundakulam. Wishful thinking ought not to cloud India’s options.

    (The author, Brahma Chellaney, is professor, Centre for Policy Research)

    Wednesday, July 2, 2008

    Rising prices? Blame it on China



    WASHINGTON: Tired of high gasoline prices and rising foods costs? Well, here’s a solution. Let’s shoot the speculators.

    A chorus of politicians, including John McCain and Barack Obama, blames these financial slimeballs for piling into commodities markets and pushing prices to artificial and unconscionable levels.

    Gosh, if only it were that simple. Speculator-bashing is another exercise in scapegoating and grandstanding. Leading politicians either don’t understand what’s happening or don’t want to acknowledge their own complicity.

    Granted, raw material prices have exploded across the board. From 2002 to 2007, oil rose 177%, corn 70%, copper 360% and aluminum 95%. But that’s just the point. Did speculators really cause all those increases? If so, why did some prices go up more than others? And what about steel?

    It rose 117%, and has increased further in 2008, even though it isn’t traded on commodities futures markets . A better explanation is basic supply and demand. Despite the US slowdown, the world economy has boomed. Since 2002, annual growth has averaged 4.6%, the highest sustained rate since the 1960s, says economist Michael Mussa of the Peterson Institute.

    By their nature, raw materials (food, energy, minerals) sustain the broader economy. They’re not just frills. When unexpectedly high demand strains existing production, prices rise sharply as buyers scramble for scarce supplies. That’s what happened. “No one foresaw that China would grow at a 10% annual rate for over a decade. Commodity producers just didn’t invest enough,” says analyst Joel Crane of Deutsche Bank.

    In industry after industry, global buying has bumped up against production limits. In 1999, surplus world oil capacity totalled 5 million barrels a day (mbd) on global consumption of 76 mbd, reckons the US Energy Information Administration.

    Now, the surplus is about 2 mbd, and much of that is high-sulphur oil not prized by refiners, on consumption of 86 mbd. Or take non-ferrous metals, such as copper and aluminum. “You had a long period of underinvestment in these industries,” says economist John Mothersole of Global Insight.

    For some metals, the collapse of the Soviet Union threw added production, previously destined for tanks, planes and ships, onto world markets. Prices plunged as surpluses grew. But Mothersole says “the accelerating growth in India and China eliminated the overhang.”

    China now accounts for up to 80% of the world’s annual increased use of some metals. Commodity price increases vary, because markets vary. Rice isn’t zinc. No surprise. But speculators played little role in these price run-ups.

    Who are these offensive souls? Well, they often don’t fit the stereotype of sleazy high rollers: Many manage pension funds or university and foundation endowments. Their trading might drive up prices if they were investing in stocks or real estate . But commodity investing is different.

    Investors generally don’t buy the physical goods, whether oil or corn. Instead, they trade futures contracts, which are bets on future prices in, say, six months. For every trader betting on higher prices, another is betting on lower prices. These trades are matched.

    In the stock market, all investors (buyers and sellers) can profit in a rising market, and all can lose in a falling market. In futures markets, one trader’s gain is another’s loss. Futures contracts enable commercial consumers and producers of commodities to hedge.

    Airlines can lock in fuel prices by buying oil futures; farmers can lock in selling prices for their grain by selling grain futures. The markets work because numerous financial players, speculators in it for the money, can take the other side of hedgers’ trades. But the frantic trading doesn’t directly affect the physical supplies of raw materials.

    In theory, high futures prices might reduce physical supplies by inspiring hoarding. But that’s not happening now. Inventories are modest. World wheat stocks, compared with consumption, are near historic lows. Recently, giant mining company Rio Tinto disclosed an average 85% price increase in iron ore for its Chinese customers.

    That affirmed that physical supply and demand, not financial shenanigans, is setting prices: Iron ore isn’t traded on futures markets. The crucial question is whether these price increases will continue or ease as demand abates and investments in new capacity expand supply.

    Prices for some commodities (lead, nickel) have receded. Could oil be next? Politicians promise to tighten regulation of futures markets, but futures markets aren’t the main problem. Scarcities are. Government subsidies for corn-based ethanol have increased food prices by diverting more grain into biofuels.

    A third of this year’s US corn crop could go to ethanol. Restrictions on oil drilling in the United States have reduced global production and put upward pressure on prices. If politicians wish to point fingers of blame, they should start with themselves.

    2 Jul, 2008, 0621 hrs IST,Robert J Samuelson
    (c) 2008, The Washington Post Writers Group

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    Thursday, June 26, 2008

    Nuclear Deal

    Some of the comments picked in the media on the nuclear deal:

    - CPM spokesperson Pandhe: “as Muslims were opposed to the nuclear deal and since the Samajwadi Party enjoyed the community's support in Uttar Pradesh, it should refrain from backing the deal.”

    - The deal will not gain much political as there will not be much publicity feel members of the Congress.

    - The deal should go through to save the face of the Prime Minister.

    Did someone say whether the deal was good for India. Yes, that is what they apparently seem to be arguing about. Read between the lines and one can see that the decisive factors are the ones stated above. Ego, communal politics and looming elections are the main drivers. (Mulayam Singh of Samajwadi Party did say that the deal is not in India’s interest, but I very much doubt what knowledge he has on the deal.)

    God save our country!

    Tuesday, June 17, 2008

    Indian to the Core, and an Oligarch

    Published: June 15, 2008



    AT a recent cricket match here, Mukesh D. Ambani sat in his private box quietly watching the team he owns, the Mumbai Indians. He seemed oblivious to the others around him: his son cheering wildly, his wife draped in diamond jewelry and a smattering of guests anxiously awaiting the briefest opportunity to speak with him.

    A minor bureaucrat stood a few rows back, strategizing with aides about how to buttonhole “the Chairman,” as Mr. Ambani is sometimes called. Waiters in baggy tuxedoes took turns trying to offer him a snack, but as they drew near became too nervous to speak.

    In the last century, Mohandas K. Gandhi was India’s most famous and powerful private citizen. Today, Mr. Ambani is widely regarded as playing that role, though in a very different way. Like Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Ambani belongs to a merchant caste known as the modh banias, is a vegetarian and a teetotaler and is a revolutionary thinker with bold ideas for what India ought to become.

    Yet Mr. Gandhi was a scrawny ascetic, a champion of the village, a skeptic of modernity and a man focused on spiritual purity. Mr. Ambani is a fleshy oligarch, a champion of the city, a burier of the past and a man who deftly — and, some critics say, ruthlessly — wields financial power. He is the richest person in India, with a fortune estimated in the tens of billions of dollars, and many people here expect that he will be the richest person on earth before long.

    Although he lacks a politician’s silver tongue — he can be a nervous public speaker, and his diction can be halting — he talks more like a father of the nation than a corporate executive. Describing his goals, he says they are for India’s benefit as much as they are for his sprawling company, Reliance Industries.

    “Can we really banish abject poverty in this country?” he mused aloud in a rare interview at his headquarters here. “Yes, in 10, 15 years we can say we would have done that substantially. Can we make sure that we create a social structure where we remove untouchability? We’re fast moving to a new India where you don’t think about this caste and that caste.”

    As millions of Indians graduate from burning cow dung for energy to guzzling oil, Reliance is plowing billions of dollars into energy exploration and is building the world’s largest oil refinery. It has also opened a chain of nearly 700 stores selling food and various wares; Mr. Ambani promises that it will funnel money from the flourishing cities into the struggling agricultural heartland. He envisions Reliance, with $39 billion in revenue, as providing incomes to 12 million to 30 million Indians within the next five years by buying from farmers and employing new workers in its stores.

    And as Mumbai, Mr. Ambani’s hometown and the commercial and entertainment capital of India, has grown ever more populous and ever less livable, he has proposed that Reliance simply build a new, improved city across the harbor.

    MR. AMBANI, 51, who feuded with his younger brother after their father died six years ago, took control of roughly half of the divided company. Even as he enters new areas, he has maintained his family’s dominance in its petrochemical, oil and gas and textile manufacturing businesses.

    Indian Tycoon’s Tale

    He maintains a low public profile; even those close to him describe him as inscrutable. On one hand, he is seen as a man whose heart bleeds for India. He is motivated by “the ability to change the face of the country,” said K. V. Kamath, the C.E.O. of ICICI Bank and a longtime financier and friend of the Ambanis. “That is the biggest kick anybody would get today — that they could touch the lives of a large number of these billion people and make things better for them.”

    On the other hand, Mr. Ambani is also known as someone who lets little stand in his or Reliance’s way.

    “Remember: these guys all grew up in the License Raj,” said a close friend of the tycoon, referring to India’s decades-long experiment with rigid state control over the economy. “They grew up as lotuses from the filth. It makes them tough, it makes them suspicious, it makes them vindictive at times, and it makes them come out in a hurry. They always see life as, ‘Oh God, better not miss an opportunity.’ ”

    “When they were growing up,” added the friend, who requested anonymity for fear of upsetting Mr. Ambani, “you didn’t get a second chance.”

    Emblematic of his ascent is the towering residence he is building on what was once known as Altamount Road, one of the most exclusive streets here. Hundreds of feet tall, it will offer several levels of parking, a multi-tiered gymnasium, a ballroom, a theater, ample living and guest quarters, and a helipad on the roof. (Although the price tag for the residence has drawn estimates as high as $2 billion, a Reliance spokesman said it would ultimately cost $50 million to $70 million.)

    For generations, Altamount was a favored address for India’s Anglicized elite, a group British imperialists groomed in their own image. To a 19th-century British official, Thomas Babington Macaulay, they were “interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.”

    Skip to next paragraph
    Jacob Silberberg for The New York Times

    Shoppers at a supermarket owned by Reliance. It is building a network of hundreds of stores. More Photos >

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    Mukesh Ambani, front left, and his younger brother, Anil, front right, at the funeral of their father, Dhirubhai. More Photos >

    As time went on, the elites were steeped in British culture, spoke with Oxbridge accents, pooh-poohed Bollywood films and danced only to British and American music. They dismissed those who spoke Indian languages at home as “vernies,” short for “vernaculars.”

    Then, in the 1990s, Bombay changed its name to Mumbai, and Altamount was renamed S. K. Barodawalla Marg. Neither name has stuck with everyone, but the changes were part of an emerging movement to purge India of its colonial legacy.

    Such changes accompanied the rise to power of a new class of Indians who want to live and work and raise their children in India, who are tethered to Indian values, food and popular culture and who are unapologetic about their indigenous tastes. The Ambanis are this class’s first family.

    MANY other Indian business families have been rich for generations, and their scions don finely cut suits and flaunt fussy tastes. Ratan Tata cruises down Marine Drive on Sundays in fast cars and favors Hermès ties with matching handkerchiefs. Vijay Mallya is said to be trailed in his home by a butler holding a silver tray with a cigar and a Scotch. Adi and Parmeshwar Godrej are famous for soirées that attract Hollywood stars.

    Mr. Ambani comports himself quite differently. Among family members, he prefers speaking Gujarati to English, friends say. He may ask colleagues to stop at the temple with him during business trips to partake in a ritual Hindu prayer. He loathes Western suits, preferring a white short-sleeved shirt, black trousers and black shoes that resemble sneakers cross-bred with office wingtips.

    His idea of entertainment is not ballet but Bollywood; he watches as many as three films a week at home in a private theater. “You need some amount of escapism in life,” he says. “Those two or three hours give you relief.”

    He has a legendary appetite, but mostly for the food of the bustling Mumbai streets. He has been known to walk out of fancy restaurants in search of dosas, south Indian crepes sold by the roadside. And he carries those preferences with him when he travels.

    One evening, when Mr. Ambani and a former Stanford classmate, Akhil Gupta, were in New York, they dined at Nobu, the popular Japanese restaurant. Mr. Ambani, a vegetarian, picked at the fare, finding it bland. At the end of the meal, Mr. Gupta recalls him saying: “That was nice. Now should we go have dinner?”

    For Mr. Ambani, it’s all a matter of comfort food.

    “Personally, I still have to eat my dal, roti, chaval,” he says, using the Hindi words for lentil soup, flatbread and rice. “I just have not developed those tastes.”

    He recalls “a lot of emulation” of Western ways surrounding him as a child. “My view was: ‘What the hell, man! We can do what we feel like.’ I think what has changed now, and it is changing in multiple generations, is this self-confidence and self-belief.”

    His preferences reflect a wider cultural transformation in India, admirers say. “If you look at his interests, they’re very rooted in India,” says Nandan M. Nilekani, co-chairman of Infosys Technologies, a leading outsourcing company in India. “He’s not trying to impress anyone else. It’s part of a broader shift in self-confidence that is happening, where people are no longer looking at Westernized symbols of having arrived.”

    The foundation of the Ambanis’ wealth was laid relatively recently, when Mr. Ambani’s father, Dhirubhai, opened Reliance’s doors in 1958, the year after Mr. Ambani was born.

    The father started the company in a tiny, sparsely furnished trading office in Mumbai, first exporting spices to Yemen, then entering the yarn trade, a business that required special canniness. At that time, the government was severely restricting large-scale manufacturing, so importing yarn required hard-to-get licenses and creative maneuvering around the bureaucracy.

    Mr. Ambani and his younger brother, Anil, spent their childhoods in the down-market Bhuleshwar neighborhood, in a two-bedroom apartment in a humble building that Mumbai residents call a “chawl”: a tenement obscured from major roads by more attractive towers. Metal grates still cover the windows and, in a country where a maid is a hallmark of middle-class life, the neighborhood’s chores fall to homemakers who flog mattresses clean and scrub dirty clothes in soapy buckets.

    It is customary in the chawls to live communally: anyone’s children are everyone’s children, and as a child Mr. Ambani would visit a neighbor’s house to feast on puris, small discs of fried wheat. In that house one day, a bathroom door slammed shut and severed half of his left pinky. Times were tight in his youth, and he went without an allowance. Friends say, and Mr. Ambani agrees, that growing up as he did gave him an edge over many business peers: While he would go on to enjoy all the privileges of a second-generation billionaire, his early childhood instilled the combative mentality of an outsider typically found among first-generation entrepreneurs.

    “All of us, in a sense, struggle continuously all the time, because we never get what we want,” Mr. Ambani says. “The important thing which I’ve really learned is how do you not give up, because you never succeed in the first attempt.”

    Reliance was thriving by the late 1960s, and the family moved out of the chawls and into one of Mumbai’s best neighborhoods. But his father, who had never finished high school and worried that his children might grow up too pampered, hired a tutor whose responsibility was to spend three hours a day taking Mukesh, and later his siblings, on working-class field trips: riding public transportation, buying tickets at the rail station. Once a year, the tutor arranged a visit to a village for about two weeks.

    It was “one of the best things that happened to me in my life,” Mr. Ambani said of the field trips. “We never studied. We went out and learned how to play hockey. And we went by bus, and we went by train, and we said, ‘This is what life looks like.’ ”

    Years later, when Mr. Ambani enrolled in an M.B.A. program at Stanford, his father clung to the belief that real learning came in the trenches, not in academic enclaves like Palo Alto. He summoned Mr. Ambani home in 1980, halfway through the two-year program, to take charge of a yarn manufacturing project.

    Working in an Indian village, he won high praise from some of those around him. He slept in a trailer on site and juggled an attention to detail with big dreams. “I found him an extremely receptive listener who was learning all the time,” said Mr. Kamath, a lender to the Ambanis at the time. “He virtually camped out there. It is very unusual for any leader that I have dealt with.”

    FRIENDS of Mr. Ambani say the plant’s completion, on schedule, marked his emergence as his own man in his father’s burgeoning corporate empire. By then, Reliance was already one of India’s boldest companies, combining a heady vision for the future with the brass-knuckle tactics required to get there.

    In setting up the yarn factory, Mr. Ambani also displayed the first glimmers of his management style. The close friend who had spoken on the condition of anonymity compared Mr. Ambani to the mom-and-pop traders who populated his Gujarati caste ancestry: “He’s a guy who likes to get his hands dirty,” he says. “He is a shopkeeper in many ways. He wants to sit at the till. He wants to see what’s going on.”

    His greatest talent, as Ravi Venkatesan, the chairman of Microsoft India, puts it, is for being “in the clouds as well as in the details.”

    “In my life, I’ve only met a few people who are able to think on a staggering scale and take the risks to match it,” Mr. Venkatesan says. “Bill Gates comes to mind.”

    As Mr. Ambani grew older, Reliance entered a raft of new businesses, gaining more power and placing ever bigger bets on nascent industries. As the eldest son in a traditional Indian family, he helped oversee the company’s diversification into petrochemicals, then energy, then cellphones. His father made him a board member at the age of 17 or 18, he says; and because he was involved with Reliance when it was “just a textile company,” he says he has always felt that he built it with his father, rather than simply inheriting it.

    “My big advantage was to have my father accept me as first-generation,” he says. “He treated me like a partner, saying, ‘O.K., let’s go do this.’ And more than that, he gave me the full freedom, the ability to bet the house. So in 1980, he was saying, ‘Here, take 80 crores of rupees’ ” — about $100 million then — “ ‘and build a polyester plant.’ ”

    Over the years, Reliance morphed from a small family business into a publicly traded empire, adopting new standards of corporate governance, publishing glossy annual reports and signing up shareholders across the nation. By the time the elder Mr. Ambani died, in 2002, he had become a legend, mourned by throngs of ordinary Indians winding through Mumbai’s streets. The socialist, Gandhian regime he challenged had yielded, beginning in the 1990s, to the kind of bare-knuckles capitalism he had zealously advocated.

    Arun Shourie, a politician and former cabinet minister who in his younger days as a journalist had publicly crusaded against Reliance and what he considered to be its heavy-handed business practices, acknowledged a year after the elder Mr. Ambani’s death that he had made a “180-degree turn” in his view of the company. “They set up world-class companies and facilities in spite of those regulations,” he said in a speech in 2003. “By exceeding the limits and restrictions, they created the case for scrapping those regulations. They made a case for reforms.”

    IN 2004, two years after the elder Mr. Ambani died, his sons began battling each other for control of Reliance. Their mother, Kokilaben, also a major shareholder, ended the squabble in 2005 by giving Anil control of Reliance’s newer service businesses like telecommunications, electric power and banking. Mukesh got the portfolio of industrial businesses. Each half now operates independently.

    Today, both brothers are respected chief executives, though they are said by friends to speak to each other rarely, if ever. Neither of the brothers publicly discusses the relationship.

    Anil Ambani, who friends say struggled to be taken seriously as Mr. Ambani’s younger brother, has emerged on his own as a business leader, taking the cellphone business, in particular, to new heights. But it is his older brother, with his gargantuan, quasi-public projects in energy, retailing and urban renewal, who has become the most visible symbol of India’s visceral transformation.

    Ticking off one Indian problem at a time, Mr. Ambani has proposed for each a Reliance solution.

    While India was once largely self-sufficient in oil and gas, a swelling middle class is burning ever more energy, forcing India to become an energy importer and straining the country’s development. So he is building a world-class oil refining and petrochemical complex in Jamnagar, in the western state of Gujarat.

    The $6 billion facility can already process 660,000 barrels a day, and it has helped India to become self-sufficient in producing finished gasoline — though it still must import crude oil. It is one of the most profitable refineries in the world, and Mr. Ambani plans to double its capacity.

    Two-thirds of India’s 1.1 billion people still live off the land, and to combat the cycle of poverty that ensnares rural dwellers — while presumably making a handsome profit for his company — Mr. Ambani also wants to foment an agricultural revolution.

    He has begun building a nationwide network of hundreds of Western-style supermarkets and other retail outlets, hoping to connect them directly with farmers who have traditionally sold to middlemen, many of whom pay less than market prices and are widely regarded as deceitful and usurious.

    In some regions, Reliance’s supermarket push has caused grateful farmers to change their habits and become more productive. But in other areas, landowners have protested Reliance’s acquisition of their property; elsewhere, shopkeepers have staged violent rallies against a supermarket chain that they fear will decimate them. Some states, including Uttar Pradesh, have sought to block Reliance from their territory.

    However these challenges are resolved, some businessmen say Mr. Ambani has already established himself as India’s great transformer, with a legacy that has much in common with American industrialists of the 19th century.

    “When we talk about Rockefeller and Carnegie and all these guys, they really each changed one industry,” said Mr. Nilekani, the Infosys co-chairman. “But if you look at what he’s doing, he’s really changing three or four industries.”

    Like Rockefeller and Carnegie, however, Mr. Ambani has also gone to great lengths — and, critics say, used tough-minded, combative tactics — to secure his company’s fortunes, as well as its social and political influence.

    DRIVE past the Makers Chambers IV building in Mumbai on a Saturday night, where Reliance’s headquarters are housed, and you often see the lights blazing inside. Mr. Ambani routinely enters the office after 11 a.m. and stays as late as midnight — even on Saturdays. Employees, eager to follow their leader, usually do the same.

    Reliance, like many of its peers, is something of a hierarchical, old-style Indian enterprise, despite its accomplishments. Companies like these are typically run by a big family, whose word is law and whose patriarch’s photo, garlanded with flowers, is everywhere. They tend to have a layer of courtiers below the ruling family who are valued for loyalty as much as merit. Playful disagreements are tolerated, but the boss is often insulated from actual criticism.

    In addition to keeping a tight rein on employees, the old-style companies tend to work hard at “managing government,” as their executives call it. Sometimes that involves outright bribery of government officials; sometimes it might involve paying the American college tuition of a bureaucrat’s child.

    Although rumors that it actively engages in bribery swirl around Reliance, Mr. Ambani says it has never paid a bribe or broken a rule. “These are all fables,” he says, dismissing the rumors.

    But he concedes that there are indirect ways for Reliance to curry favor. Although he says Reliance “never” pays the tuitions of bureaucrats’ children, he also acknowledges that foundations controlled by or affiliated with Reliance sometimes have.

    “Some foundation would have given some scholarship maybe, but that’s all out in the public domain,” he says.

    In interviews, two former Reliance employees and other close associates of Mr. Ambani, all of whom requested anonymity because they were afraid of jeopardizing relationships with him, say the company also routinely engages in political lobbying and covert monitoring to gain a leg up on its rivals.

    To be sure, such practices are hardly uncommon in India. But people in the Indian business scene say few companies match Reliance’s record of having laws changed in its favor and of protecting itself from extensive outside scrutiny. “Everyone is trying to bend the rules,” said Deepak Talwar, a New Delhi lobbyist who has never worked for Reliance but described Mr. Ambani as a friend. “They just do it better, with a combination of understanding, relationships and a bit of cash.”

    Mr. Ambani, however, disagrees with at least one element of Mr. Talwar’s calculus. “I don’t think that payments per se work,” he says. “I personally think that money can do very little. And this has been my experience all across.”

    Mr. Ambani doesn’t dispute that Reliance tries to exert its influence when necessary, but says that influence-peddling is unimportant relative to its other strengths. “I still think that’s not a critical success factor,” he says.

    What is a factor is “relationships,” a word that Mr. Ambani and his acolytes relish. “We believe in relationships,” he says. If someone helpful to Reliance needs an introduction, consider it done. If they need to use the private jet or gain access to a coveted temple to pray, consider it done.

    What most distinguishes Reliance from its rivals is what Mr. Ambani’s friends and associates describe as his “intelligence agency,” a network of lobbyists and spies in New Delhi who they say collect data about the vulnerabilities of the powerful, about the minutiae of bureaucrats’ schedules, about the activities of their competitors.

    Mr. Ambani said in the interview that all such activities were overseen by his brother before they split, and had since been expunged from his tranche of the company. “We de-merged all of that,” he says, breaking out in a belly laugh. A spokesman for Anil Ambani declined to comment.

    Nonetheless, Reliance, some observers say, still manages to stay very well informed. “Their intelligence on government is very strong,” Mr. Talwar says. “If a meeting were to be held and the subject was affecting their business, they would know about it.”

    Critics say Reliance has been especially effective at managing the press. Both former Reliance executives, who requested anonymity for fear of angering Mr. Ambani, say the company has actively curried favor with journalists to help it track the progress of negative articles. A prominent Indian editor, formerly of The Times of India, who requested anonymity because of concerns about upsetting Mr. Ambani, says Reliance maintains good relationships with newspaper owners; editors, in turn, fear investigating it too closely.

    “I don’t think anyone else comes close to it,” the editor said of Reliance’s sway. “I don’t think anyone is able to work the system as they can.”

    And the net result is plain: although India’s raucous news media have brought down many a powerful person and institution, Mr. Ambani and Reliance are rarely the subjects of hard-hitting Indian reporting.

    Reliance disagrees, regarding itself as the target of relentless media attacks. “There is malicious and negative stuff being written all the time. So where is the influence?” the Reliance spokesman said. “Mr. Ambani has told me that he will never pick up the phone and talk to the owner of a publication to say, ‘Write positive stuff’ or, ‘Stop writing negative stuff.’ ”

    IN the old days, if Mr. Ambani had anything to tell his father, it was done in the quiet, diplomatic way that an older generation expected. Now a father himself, he has found his own three children blunter. His teenage daughter, for example, questions her father’s environmental record.

    “I think that all this is great,” he remembers her saying of his vast empire. “But you know, you should be careful. You are in the plastics business. It’s not one of the greatest. It pollutes a lot. I’d like you to re-evaluate your portfolio.”

    Recounting the episode, he laughs, because, with billions of dollars in that business, it may be a little too late.

    But Mr. Ambani is indeed thinking beyond his current portfolio. One of the more intriguing ideas swishing around is a quixotic plan for making India a rival to China in manufacturing. The Chinese model consists of large factories in urban areas, populated by millions of migrant laborers who produce goods at cheap prices. Similar efforts have lagged in India, because it remains difficult to acquire land from farmers here, because corruption hinders large infrastructure projects, and because red tape remains so sticky.

    Mr. Ambani’s vision is to turn India’s weakness on its head. If manufacturing remains small-scale and fragmented, let it stay that way, he says. “The next big thing is how do you create manufacturing with decentralized employment,” he says. “The Chinese have got very disciplined top-down systems. We have our bottom-up creative systems.”

    He mentions products like handmade leather sandals from the Sugar Belt a few hours south of Mumbai, tie-dyed Bandhani saris from Gujarat, artisanal pottery, clothes, jewelry and the like. These wares would be produced in rural areas, sometimes in a villager’s own home. Reliance would forgo manufacturing them and instead teach residents what to make, gather the wares from disparate villages, oversee quality and market and distribute the products.

    This is yet another sense in which Mr. Ambani, the most unlikely of Gandhians, is vaguely Gandhian. Mr. Gandhi was famous for his passion for small-scale rural production, symbolized by the spinning wheel. (It is, of course, unlikely that Mr. Gandhi would have endorsed Mr. Ambani’s plan to profit on such goods.)

    “How do you really bring about, in a country of a billion people, the individuality of every single individual?” Mr. Ambani asks. “How do you make sure that you create systems that empower everybody and bring them to their true potential? This is what actually Gandhi taught us.”

    “The optimistic part to me,” he adds, “is that now these goals look achievable.”

    Given such passions, why not enter the political arena?

    “I think I can do much, much more in my particular job,” he replies.



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